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MEDIA: ASSET OR LIABILITY? AN ARGUMENT
IN FAVOR OF HOLDING THE MEDIA LIABLE
FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY

INTRODUcTION

As the world grows more crowded, an individual's right to
privacy becomes increasingly more valuable.' This right, however,
constantly conflicts with the First Amendment, 2 which guarantees
the freedoms of speech and press. 3 The Fourth Amendment protects
"the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects." 4 While the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
I See U.S. v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-316 (1951) (Frank, J., dissenting) (stating "A sane,
decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny,
some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's castle.");
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890)
(stating complexity of life renders some retreat from the world); see also Melvin Gutterman, A
Fornulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technology
Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 665 (1998) (stating scope of amendment's
protection has been reduced); G.Beatco, CULTURE WATCH: Why Reality Based Entertainment
Is Bad for Reality, NEWSDAY, May 17,1998 at B6 (discussing increase in reality television and its
effect on society).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in full:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Id; see also Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognized tension between
public's right to information and individual's interest in privacy); Rebecca Porter, Media 'RideAlongs' Violate the Constitution, Supreme Court Rules, 35 JUL. TRIAL. 120 (1999) (stating amicus

curiae brief on behalf of 24 news organizations).
3 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 756-57 (1976) (stating guarantees of First Amendment); see also Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 762-763 (1972) (acknowledging First Amendment rights); Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 386-390 (1969) (discussing First Amendment); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (holding First Amendment protects right to speak).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 83 (1998) (discussing
limits of Fourth Amendment); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1985) (discussing scope of
Fourth Amendment's protection). See generally William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A
Man's House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendent to the United States
Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY. Q. 371, 400 (1980) (analyzing English tradition and American
legislation).
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protection is not entirely clear, 5 the Supreme Court has stated that
its purpose is to protect the privacy and security of an individual
from invasion by government officials.6
The conflict between the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy
and the First Amendment's freedom of press was recently
addressed by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Layne. 7 In Wilson, the
Court decided the issue of whether a media "ride-along" with police
during an execution of a warrant was constitutionally permissible.8
This issue had been addressed by several of the Circuit Courts,9 but
not resolved until Wilson, where the Supreme Court concluded that
law enforcement officers had violated the Fourth Amendment by
bringing media members into a home during the execution of a
warrant.10 The Court, however, did not resolve the issue of whether
the media itself had also violated the defendant's right to privacy.1 '
Historically, one's right to protect information 12 has been weighed
5 See Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596, 602 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting courts holding in Ayeni);
see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendnent, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
385 (1974) (acknowledging key to amendment is to determine interests it protects); Elsa Y.
Ransom, Home: No Place for "Law Enforcement Theatricals" - The Outlawing of Police/Media Home
Invasions in Ayeni v. Mottola, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 325 (1995) (discussing Ayeni and effect on
media). See generally Tracey L. Mitchell, Smile! You're on Candid Camera:Media Presence and the
Execution of Warrants;50 S.C. L. REV. 949, 962 n.67 (1999) (stating limits on courts' decisions to
recognize specific right against media intrusion).
6 See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(asserting central purpose of Fourth Amendment); see also Anderson v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 482 n.l (1976) (asserting manner in which law enforcement officers must conduct
searches). See generally U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (discussing execution of
search warrants); Camora v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
7 526 U.S. 603 (1999); see also Ronald B. Kowalczyk, Supreme Court Slams the Door on the
Press: Media "Ride-Along" Found Unconstitutional in Wilson v. Layne, 9 J. ART & ENT. LAW 353,
353 (1999) (analyzing decision in Wilson). See generally Brad M. Johnston, The Media's Presence
During the Execution of a Searc Warrant:A Per Se Violation of the FourthAmendment, 58 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1499, 1511-1514 (1997) (discussing issues raised in Ayeni); Kevin E. Lunday, Pennitting
Media Participationin Federal Searches: Exploring the Consequencesfor the United States Following
Ayeni v. Mottola and a Framework for Analysis, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 278, 280-81 (1997)
(discussing issues presented in Ayeni).
8 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 608; see also Kowalczyk, supra note 7, at 353 (discussing holding in
Wilson v. Layne). See generally Mitchell, supra note 5, at 962 n67 (1999) (discussing
constitutional issues raised in Wilson).
9 See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 510 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding search of residence with
media violated Fourth Amendment); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445, 446 (8th Cir. 1996)
(reasoning reporters are not under color of state law when entering homes); Bills, 52 F.3d at
600 (supporting conclusion of Fourth Amendment violation); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680,
686 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding media's presence during warrant execution violated Fourth
Amendment).
10 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 613 (holding that Fourth Amendment violation had occurred
specifically when media members were not aiding officers).
11 See Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 683 (recognizing tension between public's right to information and
individual's interest in privacy); see also Kowalczyk, supra note 7, at 353 (stating extent of
Court's holding).
12 See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994)
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against the rights afforded by the First Amendment. 13 The
constitutional privilege of freedom of press, which ultimately may
violate an individual's right to privacy, has not been given a great
deal of attention by the Supreme Court.14 This has resulted in
confusion by the state courts in attempting to address the issue.
The Supreme Court's decision in Wilson raises several interesting
questions: whether the Court was correct in not finding the media
liable for invasion of privacy that occurs during a ride-along;
whether the media's intrusion into an individual's life in general,
violates the right to privacy; and to what extent the media can shield
itself behind the First Amendment. Another important issue is
whether the Supreme Court should define the exact boundaries of
the First Amendment's freedom of the press in publishing private
facts, or whether the Court should continue to allow states to utilize
their own interpretations.
Part I of this Note will balance the purposes of the First and
Fourth Amendments and discuss the genesis of the search warrant.
Part II will analyze the Wilson decision and demonstrate how the
Supreme Court should have held the media liable for violating an
individual's privacy rights. Part III will examine media interference
with the right to privacy and discuss the possibilities of establishing
proper tort standards. Part IV will examine an approach state courts
have used to hold the media liable, concluding that the Supreme
Court should adopt a similar standard as a clear test to determine
the issue of media liability for invasion of privacy.

(acknowledging right of informational privacy); see also White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 774
(1975) (stating informational privacy is core value furthered by privacy initiative); William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 392-398 (1960) (defining informational privacy as right to
control dissemination of private personal information). See generally, Gary Williams, The Right
of Privacy Versus the Right to Know: The War Continues, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 215, 216 (1999)
(stating courts have upheld right to informational privacy).
13 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214 (stating "privacy does not prevent
publishing matters of public interest while acknowledging law should protect matters of no
legitimate concern from undesirable publicity"); see also Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d
806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 277 (1953) (weighing
privacy interests); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 290 (1931) (stating people, willingly or
unwillingly, can become actor in occurrence of public interest).
14 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (declining to address question of
whether truthful publications may be subject to civil liability consistent with First and Fourth
Amendments); see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (limiting constitutional
protection of press to narrow holding); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967) (avoiding
addressing private rights issue).
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS
A. The FirstAmendment's "Right to Knozv"
The First Amendment includes a public right of access to court
documents and other types of information.1 5 This right stems from
the idea that it is necessary to a self-governing democracy for the
public to have access to such information. 16 In Grosjean v. American
Press Co.,17 the Supreme Court recognized this right to information,
describing it as "the natural right of the members of an organized
society, united for their common good, to impart and acquire
information about their common interests." 1 8 The Court emphasized
the importance of the press and its dissemination of information to
the public for use against "misgovernment."'19
B. Scope of Fourth Amendment Protection
An individual's right to privacy has long been revered as a
fundamental right. "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
15 See Peter G. Blumberg, Sunshine and Ill Will: The Forecastfor Public Access to Sealed Search
Warrants, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 434 (1992) (discussing rights conveyed under First
Amendment). See generally Michael Dicke, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations
on News Source Recoveny for Breach of a ConfidentialityAgreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1553, 1558-59
(1989) (discussing roles of media); Charles C. Scheim, Trash Tort or Trash TV? Food Lion, Inc. v.
ABC, Inc., and Tort Liability of the Media for Newsgathering, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 185, 193 (1998)
(discussing protection given to media).
16 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1982) (discussing
that public right of access "serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively
participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government"); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (stating that abridging freedoms of press and speech "impairs
those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of the power of
correcting error through the processes of popular government"); Blumberg, supra note 15, at
435 (analyzing right of access); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
579-80 (1980) (holding public has constitutional right to attend criminal trial); Lieutenant
Colonel Denise R. Lind, Media Rights of Access to Proceedings, Infonnation and Participants in
Militan Criminal Cases, 163 MIL. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2000) (discussing media right of access to
certain information).
17 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
18 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 243; see also Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-05 (discussing
importance of public right of access to information); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 95
(stating that freedoms of press and speech are "essential").
19 See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (stating "informed public opinion is the most potent of all
restraints upon misgovernment" and press is "vital source of public information"); see also
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. at 604-05 (discussing that public right of
access ensures effective participation in government); Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 95 (emphasizing
importance of freedoms of press and speech in correcting government error).
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from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
20
unquestionable authority of law."
Although the United States Constitution does not specifically
enumerate a privacy right, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that it grants a general right to privacy, which is found by
examining several of the amendments. 21
Under the Fourth
Amendment, for instance, an individual's right to privacy is
protected by limiting governmental searches and seizures "to
prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement
officials." 22
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment. 23 The Amendment limits its protection to preventing
searches and seizures that are unreasonable. 24 A search that takes
place without a warrant is not automatically deemed unreasonable
because a warrant is not always necessary to conduct a search. If
the existence of probable cause can be established, a search that
takes place without a warrant is considered reasonable. 25
Probable cause has been defined by Justice Washington as "a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the
belief that the Party is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged." 26 This definition led the Supreme Court, in Stacey v.
Emery, 27 to adopt language that describes when probable cause
exists: "[i]f the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as
20 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); Warren & Brandeis, supra note
1, at 196 (arguing for privacy right). But see Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. at 83 (discussing
limits of Fourth Amendment).
21 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (describing right to privacy as
"penumbral" and discussing "zone of privacy" found in various Constitutional amendments).
22 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 42. U.S. at 878; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
23 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
24 See Skinner v. Railway, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
682 (1985); Schmerber v.California, 384 U.S. 757, 786 (1966); Carroll, 267 U.S.at 147.
25 See Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searchingfor Histon, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1707, 1722 (1996) (discussing reasonableness of probable searches); see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at
147; Deborah F. Barfield, DNA Fingerprinting - ]ustifiing the Special Need for the Fourth
Amendment's Intnsion into the Zone of Privacy, 6 RICH J.L. & TECH. 27, 27 (2000) (stating search
and seizure conducted with probable cause is "unquestionably reasonable").
26 See Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878) (citing Munn, 3 Wash. 37); see also Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (defining probable cause standard); JiUian Grossman, The
Fourth Amendment: Relaxing the Rule in Chiild Abuse Investigations, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1303,
1333-34 (2000) (stating that mere subjective belief will not suffice for reasonable suspicion).
27 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
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to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the
28
offence has been committed, it is sufficient."
The existence of probable cause is often used as a justification to
search without a warrant when the delay caused by obtaining a
warrant would allow the escape of a suspect, destruction of
evidence or endangerment of the public. 29 Allowing the search of an
automobile without a warrant is an example of one such exception
30
to the warrant requirement.
To determine whether a search is reasonable, the Supreme Court
has developed a balancing test. 31 A search is "judged by balancing
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
32
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."

C. Historical Background of the Search Warrant
Use of the search warrant began in England in the sixteenth
century. 33 British monarchs used what was known as a general
warrant to search a person's property. 34 These warrants eventually
became regarded as "overbroad and oppressive" 35 because the
authority that they granted was abused.
During colonial times in America, British rulers used writs of
assistance which allowed searches of property for the duration of
the ruler's lifetime plus an additional six months.36 The writs
28 See Stacey, 97 U.S. at 645; see also Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (defining probable cause
standard); Carroll,267 U.S. at 147 (stating same).
29 See Cloud, snpra note 25, at 1722; see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 198-99 (1967)
(holding entry into home justified); Grossman, supra note 26, at 1332 (discussing when
warrantless search allowed).
30 See Cloud, supra note 25, at 1722; see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 198-99;
Grossman, supra note 26, at 1332 (discussing when warrantless search allowed).
31 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Cloud, supra note 25, at 1722; see also
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (defining probable cause standard); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619;
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554-56.
32 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Martinez-Fiterte,428 U.S.
at 554-56; see also Blumberg, supra note 15, at 447.
33 See Blumberg, supranote 15, at 447; see also Donald L. Beli, Fidelity to the WarrantClause,
Using Magistrates, Incentives, and Telecommunications Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth
Amnendmnent Jurisprudence, 73 DENY. U.L. REV. 291, 301 (1996) (explaining writs and warrants
during colonial times); Cloud, supra note 25, at 1725 (discussing searches under early English
law).
34 See Beli, supra note 33, at 301; Blumberg, supra note 15, at 447; Cloud, supra note 25, at
1725.
35 See Beli, supra note 33, at 301; Blumberg, supra note 15, at 447; Cloud, supra note 25, at
1725.
36 See Beli, supra note 33, at 301; Blumberg, supra note 15, at 447; Cloud, supra note 25, at
1725.
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generally were used to protect against smuggling. 37 Customs

officials could search any areas they believed to be used for hiding
smuggled goods, which gave the officials immense power to search
with little justification. 38 The writs, unlike search warrants today,
did not identify the subject, location, or items to be searched. 39 Not
surprisingly, Americans opposed this early form of search
warrant. 40 Many state constitutions later included warrant clauses
restricting searches and seizures. 41 These clauses became the
foundation for the Fourth Amendment of the United States
42
Constitution.
II. WILSON V. LAYNE

There has been a growing trend to allow the media to accompany
police during the execution of a warrant. 43 In the recent decision of
Wilson v. Layne,44 the Supreme Court held that a media ride-along
violates the Fourth Amendment.
In Wilson, three warrants were issued for the arrest of Dominic
Wilson. The warrants cautioned that he was likely to be armed, to

37 See Beli, supra note 33, at 301; Blumberg, supra note 15, at 447; Cloud, supra note 25, at
1725.
38 See Beli, supra note 33, at 301; Blumberg, supra note 15, at 447; Cloud, supra note 25, at
1725.
39 See Robert J. Brantman & Scott K. Martinsen, Constitutional Law-Times Mirror Co. v.
United States and a Qualified First Amendment Right of Public Access to Search Warrant
Proceedings and Supporting Affidavits, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 788 n.63 (1990) (defining
writs of assistance); see also Blumberg, supra note 15, at 447; Ramsey Ramerman; Shut the
Blinds and Lock the Doors - Is That Enough?: The Scope of Fourth Amendment Protection Outside
Your Own Home, 75 WASH. L. REV. 281, 291 (2000) (noting that writs of assistance allowed
"broad discretion" to search).
40 See Blumberg, supra note 15, at 447; Ramerman, supra note 39, at 291 (discussing
rejection of writs of assistance); see also U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977) (stating that
searches "deeply concerned the colonists"); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 994-95 (1999) (stating that there
was "increasing hostility to sweeping general searches").
41 See Thompson, supra note 40, at 994-95 (discussing trend to restrict searches in state
constitutions); see also Blumberg, supra note 15, at 448. See generally Ramerman supra note 39, at
291 (discussing Fourth Amendment development).
42 See Blumberg, supra note 15, at 448; see also Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7-8 (stating that Fourth
Amendment protection developed "in large measure out of the colonists' experience with the
writs of assistance"); Ramerman, supra note 39, at 291 (stating Fourth Amendment developed
from rejection of writs of assistance).
43 See Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159, 163 (1996) (holding television crew presence during
execution of warrant was constitutional); Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914, 918
(1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977) (holding no recovery under "false-light" doctrine of
invasion of privacy); see also Ransom, supra note 5, at 325 (1995).
44 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
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resist arrest, and to assault police. 45 During the early morning hours
of April 16, 1992, in an attempt to execute the warrants, police
officers and two members of the media mistakenly entered the
home of Dominic's parents, Charles and Geraldine Wilson. Charles
Wilson entered his living room wearing only his briefs to find the
officers in plain clothes carrying guns. He demanded to know why
the men were there. Geraldine Wilson then entered to witness her
husband being subdued by the officers.
One of the media
representatives snapped photographs during the entire incident.4 6
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement
officers can no longer allow members of the media or other third
parties to be present during an execution of a warrant, specifically
when the third parties are not aiding the officers. 47 The Court held
this to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 48
The Fourth Amendment was designed to protect the sanctity of
the home and an individual's privacy rights therein. 49 The police
officers in Wilson were authorized to enter the home because they
had arrest warrants and a reasonable belief that the subject of the
warrants was inside.50 The officers were not, however, permitted to
invite members of the media to witness and photograph the incident
51
merely for their own commercial use.
45 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606.
46 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606-07.
47 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614; see also Home v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 249-50 (1999)
(explaining holding in Wilson); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 510 (9th Cir. 1997) (following
holding in Wilson).
48 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614; see also Home, 191 F.3d at 249-50 (explaining holding in
Wilson); Berger, 129 F.3d at 510 (following holding in Wilson).
49 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610 (stating that Fourth Amendment embodies centuries-old
principle of respect for privacy of home); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56,64 (1992) (noting
limits of Fourth Amendment); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (addressing individuals' expectation); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
653-54 (1979) (discussing standard Fourth Amendment proscribes); United States v.
Martinez - Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (acknowledging protection extends to private
dwellings); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,313 (1972) (emphasizing
importance of protecting the home); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (stating
Fourth Amendment's protection); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (discussing purpose of
Fourth Amendment); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (discussing requirements
of Fourth Amendment); see also Rossbacher, Young, & Nishimura, An Invasion of Privacy: The
Media's Involvement in Lay Enforcement Activities, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 313, 313-14 (1999)
(discussing main objective of Fourth Amendment).
50 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603-604 (1980)
(holding that officers are authorized to enter dwelling with warrant and reasonable belief that
suspect is inside); Mitchell, supra note 5, at 949 (recognizing objectives behind authorized
search warrants). See generally Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) (stating probable cause
alone does not justify search of dwelling without warrant).
51 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614; see also Horne, 191 F.3d at 249-50 (explaining holding in

20001

MEDIA INVASION OFPRIVACY

The scope of a search must not exceed the terms of its search
warrant.5 2 The Court stated in Wilson that the Fourth Amendment
requires that police actions during the execution of a warrant be
related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. 53 Since the
media members were not involved with the execution of the
warrants, their presence was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 54
A. FirstAmendment Concerns
First Amendment arguments were also addressed by the Supreme
Court in Wilson. The presence of the media during a warrant
execution may be useful in preserving evidence, minimizing abuse
by the police, or protecting officers against claims.55 The media's
freedom of press, however, more commonly serves to inform the
public of law enforcement activities and procedures.56 It is essential
under the First Amendment that the media have this freedom to
provide useful and newsworthy information to the public. 5 7 These
58
are concerns that the First Amendment was designed to protect.
Wilson); Berger, 129 F.3d at 510 (following holding in Wilson).
52 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990) (holding that seizure is
unconstitutional if scope of search exceeds warrant); Christopher D. Comeau, Investigation and
Police Practice: The Warrant Requirement, 86 GEO. L.J. 1198, 1212 (1998) (explaining excess
evidence is suppressed); Mary Brandt Jensen, T7w Scope of Warrantless Searches Under the
Automobile Exception: United States v. Ross, 43 LA. L. REV. 1561, 1568 (1983) (explaining
Court's role in searches); see also Dale v. Bartels, 732 F.2d 278, 284 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting only
property in warrant may be taken).
53 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 612; Kowalczyk, supra note 7, at 353 (discussing connection of
Wilson to television shows); Mitchell, supra note 5, at 953 (discussing implications of Wilson);
see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987)
(stating that purpose of search strictly limits extent of search); Johnston, supra note 7, at 1527
(noting media presence cannot be implied).
54 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 613.
55 See Wilson 526 U.S. at 614; Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996); see also Johnston,
supra note 7, at 1528 (stating reasons why media does not belong on searches); Eve Klindera,
Qualified inimunity for Cops (and Other Public Officials) with Caneras: Let Common Law Remedies
Ensure Press Responsibility, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 429 (1999) (arguing media presence
may increase police responsibility); Ransom, supra note 5, at 356 (1995) (stating media access
decreases effectiveness of officials).
56 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80
(1980); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 491-92; see also Dicke, supra note 15, at 1558-59
(discussing media's roles). See generally Scheim, supra note 15, at 193 (discussing protection
given to media).
57 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614; Richnond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572-73; Cox Broad. Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. at 491-92; Scheim, supra note 15, at 193 (stating courts grant great protection to
media); see also Dicke, sipra note 15, at 1558-59 (discussing roles of media).
58 See Dicke, supra note 15, at 1559 (discussing First Amendment protection for
newsgathering); see also Geoff Dendy, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort,
85 KY. L.J. 147, 152 (1997) (discussing type of speech protected). See generally D. Scott Gurney,
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Although making information available to the public regarding
police or other governmental activity is an important goal of the
First Amendment's freedom of the press, the Wilson Court stated
that "the possibility of good public relations for the police is simply
not enough [...] to justify the ride-along intrusion into a private
home."5 9 Officers, or third parties designated by the officers, are

authorized to film or photograph the execution of a warrant for the
purposes of preserving evidence or ensuring the safety of those
involved. 60 When the media is present for reasons unrelated to the
warrant execution, this exceeds the scope of the warrant, and there
is a violation of the individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 61
The issue which had previously divided the circuit courts 62 has

now been settled. Officers that allow an unauthorized member of
the media to enter an individual's home during a warrant execution
will be held liable.63 The question that remains is whether the media
will also be held liable for the actions it takes to invade an
individual's privacy.
B. Liability

Wilson did not address the issue of media liability. An argument
should have been made in favor of holding the media responsible
for its actions based on the claims of invasion of privacy and
trespass. 64
Celebrities and the First Amendment: Broader Protection Against the Unauthorized Publication of
Photographs, 61 IND. L.J. 697, 698 (1986) (stating First Amendment protection of public interest
matters); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?,9 J. ART. &
ENT. LAW 35 (1998) (arguing for freedom of speech).
59 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 612.
60 See Wilson 526 U.S. at 614; Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996); see also Johnston,
supra note 7, at 1528 (1997) (stating reasons why media does not belong on searches); Klindera,
supra note 55 at 429 (arguing media presence may increase police responsibility); Ransom,
supra note 5, 356 (1995) (stating media access decreases effectiveness of officials).
61 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610-11; see also Johnston, supra note 7, at 1533 (stating media
presence exceeding warrant as unreasonable); Kowalczyk, supra note 7, at 353 (discussing
Court's holding in Wilson).
62 See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 505 (1997); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445, 445;
Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 680 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Johnston, supra note 7, at 1499 (noting
conflicts between Second and Eighth Circuits).
63 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614.
64 See Berger, 188 F.3d at 1155; see also Eduardo W. Gonzalez, "Get that Camera Out of My
Face!" An Exanmination of the Viability of Suing "Tabloid Television"for Invasion of Privacy, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 935, 939. (1997) (discussing liability for trespass); Klindera, supra note 55, at 429;
John J. Walsh, Steven J. Selby & Jodie L. Schaffer, Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The
Constitutionalityof Consequential Damagesfor Publicationof Ill-Gotten Information, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 1111, 1111 (1996) (stating media intrusiveness is rising).
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Where information is already available to the public, there is no
invasion of privacy. 65 Such information is afforded protection
pursuant to the First Amendment. 66 In Wilson, the information
gathered by the media was not previously available to the public.
Additionally, the media representatives were not exercising rights
67
under the authority of state law to record the warrant execution.
Instead, they were acting for the sole benefit of their employer, The
Washington Post.68 Since the media did not obtain the consent of the
Wilsons to enter their home, they should have been held liable for
trespass. 69
Protection under the First Amendment is generally not a defense
to trespass claims. 70 In such situations, the media is not shielded
under the pretense of freedom of the press. 71 If there is an invasion
of privacy, members of the media are not allowed to disregard state
or federal law simply because they believe they are acting within the
72
interests of the First Amendment.
65 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-495 (1975) (refusing to uphold rule that
would create liability when information is already public); see also Ediniston v. Time, Inc., 257 F.
Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Frithv. Assoc. Press,176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
66 See Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 469; Linda N. Deitch, Breaking News: Proposing a Pooling
Requirement for Media Coverage of Live Hostage Situations, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 243, 258 (1999)
(stating media coverage of situations may benefit public); Mark Weidemaier, Balancing, Press
imunity, and the Compatibility of Tort Law with the First Amendment, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1695,
1702 (1998) (stating media has same rights as general public).
67 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 612; John W. Webber, III, Parkerv. Boyer: Disrupting the Balance
Between Fourth Amendment Protections and the Limnits of Law Enforcement Powers Duringa Search,
25 S.U.L. REV. 157, 165 (1997) (discussing media entry during search in Parker); see also
Christopher A. Rothe, The Legal Future of Future "Reality" Cop Shows: Parker v. Boyer Dismisses
Section 1983 Claims Against Police Officers and Television Stations Jointly Engaged in Searches of
Homes, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 481 (1998) (questioning qualified immunity for officers
bringing media to search).
68 See Wilson 526 U.S. at 607; see also Jason P. Isralowitz, The Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper
Ethics and Constitutional Values, 141 U.PA. L. REV. 221, 232 (1992) (discussing conduct of
reporters); Johnston, supra note 7, at 1527 (arguing media's presence as per se violation of
Fourth Amendment); Ransom, supra note 5, at 350-51.
69 See Klindera, supra note 55, at 416; Walsh, Selby, & Schaffer, supra note 64, at 1111
(noting balance between First Amendment and media misconduct); see also Lori Keeton, What
Is Really Rotten in the Food Lion Case: Chilling the Media's Unethical Newsgathering Techniques, 49
FLA. L. REV. 111, 122 (1997) (explaining trespass cause of action). See generally Desnick v.
1994).
Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 851 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ill.
70 See Klindera, supra note 55, at 417; see also Keeton, supra note 69, at 128 (stating media
has limited rights); Walsh, Selby, & Schaffer, supra note 64, at 1113 (arguing material obtained
illegally is not protected).
71 See Klindera, supra note 55, at 417; see also Keeton, supra note 69, at 128 (discussing
limited rights of media); Walsh, Selby, & Schaffer, supra note 64, at 1113 (arguing material
obtained illegally is not protected).
72 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 680-95 (1972); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832-35 (1974); Gregory F.
Monday, Cohen v. Cowles Media is Not a Promising Decision, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1243, 1255 (1992)
(stating state's interest may exceed First Amendment concerns).
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The government officials directly involved in Wilson were
safeguarded from liability pursuant to the doctrine of qualified
immunity. 73 In the words of the Court, the immunity was "granted
to the officers because they were performing discretionary functions
and their conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." 74 The officers were awarded qualified immunity because
the state of the law was unclear at the time the police allowed the
media to enter the Wilson's home.75
Holding the officers liable in this case would only serve to restrict
future information from being freely disseminated to the public.

76

For fear of liability, government officials might refrain from
allowing the media to be present during any governmental activity,
even when it is not clearly established whether media presence
would be a violation of privacy. 77 This, in turn, would prevent
information from reaching the public and inhibit several First
Amendment aims.78 Qualified immunity, however, helps to serve
the purposes of the First Amendment. 79 Under such an immunity,
officers more readily allow media members to observe
governmental activities, and the media is not prevented from
informing the public about such events. 80
73 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
394 (1989); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986); David J. Ingall, Make Sense of Qualified
Inmunity: Summany Judgement and Issuesfor the Trier of Fact, 30 CAL. W. L. REv. 201, 208 (1994)
(explaining qualified immunity).
74 Wilson v. Layne,526 U.S. 603, 607 (1999).
75 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615; Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808, 808 (1999); see also Graham, 490
U.S. at 394; Malley, 475 U.S. at 340; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
76 See Klindera, supra note 55, at 403; see also James L. Ahlstrom, McKnight v. Rees:
Delineating the Qualified Imuniyh "Haves" and "Have-nots" Among PrivateParties,1997 B.Y.U.L.
REV. 385, 389-90 (1997) (describing test court uses to apply qualified immunity); Ingall, supra
note 73, at 205 (discussing reasons for qualified immunity).
77 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 (holding that qualified immunity is issue of law to be
resolved by judge); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (reaffirming holding in
Harlow). See generally Ahlstrom, supra note 76, at 389-90 (describing test court uses in
determining qualified immunity).
78 See Jonathon B. Becker, The First Amendnent Goes Tactical: News Media Negligence and
Ongoing Criminal Incidents, 15 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 625, 627 (1995) (stating media access leads to
increased public knowledge); John P. Cronon, Subjecting the Fourth Amendment to Intennediate
Scrutiny: The Reasonableness of Media Ride-Alongs, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 949 (1999)
(discussing problems involved in ride-alongs); Klindera, supra note 55, at 403.
79 See Ingall, supra note 73, at 205 (discussing reasons for qualified immunity); see also
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing
function of First Amendment). See generally Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966)
(stating that function of press is to remedy abuses of power).
80 See Klindera, supra note 55, at 403; see also Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862-63 (discussing function
of First Amendment). See generally Mills, 384 U.S. at 218-19 (stating that function of press is to
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The Supreme Court has held that members of the media are not
entitled to the protection afforded by the doctrine of qualified
immunity. 81 The media therefore, could have been held liable for a
trespass claim in the Wilson case. 82 Trespass has been defined as an
unlawful interference with one's person, property or rights. 83 Since
the media was not acting under color of state law when it entered
the premises of Charles and Geraldine Wilson, its interference was
unlawful.

84

When a claim of trespass is asserted, quite often a media
defendant will argue express or implied consent as a defense. 85 It is
clear that in Wilson express consent was not given by the
homeowners. In light of the Supreme Court's decision against
media invasion into private homes during a warrant execution,
implied consent based upon customary proceedings was also
lacking. 86 The Court's holding may result in liability of the media in
similar future situations.
III. THE MEDIA'S INVASION OF PRIVACY

A. HistoricalRoots of Privacy Rights
The genesis of the right to privacy can be traced back to an article

remedy abuses of power).
81 See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992) (stating that qualified immunity "acts to
safeguard government, and thereby to protect the public at large, not to benefit its agents");
Berger v. Hanlon, 188 F.3d 1155, 155 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that media "are not entitled to
assert qualified immunity as a defense"); see also Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir.
1996). See generally Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 335 (1986) (discussing distinction between
public and private party claiming qualified immunity).
82 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1976), which provides "To prove a daim
for trespass, a plaintiff must demonstrate an intentional entry upon land that he possesses."
83 Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990).
84 See West v. Addams, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1998) (discussing what constitutes what is under
color of state law); see also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 219, 326 (1941) (stating color of
state law is where wrongdoer has authority of state).
85 See Klindera, supra note 55, at 416; see also Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 516-517 (9th
Cir. 1997) (discussing consent claim by media defendants); Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340
So.2d 914, 916 (1976) (discussing defense of consent); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d
220, 223 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (discussing media's claims of consent).
86 See Klindera, supra note 55, at 419; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85
(discussing media's liability for trespass); Prahl v. Brosamle, 116 Wis.2d 694 (1983) (stating
that to determine whether there is implied consent, "the questions are whether the intruder
ought reasonably to expect on the basis of custom that the landowner will not object to entry
and whether there are other facts tending to show an objection"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 330 (1976).
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written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890,87 which
articulated the need for recognition of such protection.8 8 When the
Warren & Brandeis article was written, the general concern was that
inventions of the time would cause private matters that were once
"whispered in the closets" to be "proclaimed from the roof tops." 89
These concerns led to the development of the tort of invasion of
privacy. 90 Eventually, this tort protection evolved into court
recognition of a right to informational privacy, 91 which has been
defined as the right to control the dissemination of private and
personal information. 92 This right inevitably conflicts with the
public's right to information, which is protected by the First
Amendment. 93 It has been over one hundred years since Warren
and Brandeis voiced concern over the threat of technology
interfering with our private lives. 94 With technology advancing
more rapidly than ever, privacy concerns are arguably greater now
than they were in 1890.95
87 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193 (calling for right to privacy); see also Ken
Gromley, One Hwndred Years of Privacy, 1992 W.S. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1992) (discussing Warren
and Brandeis article).
88 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193-196; see also Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (stating that privacy right is sacred); Barfield, supra note 25, at 27-28
(noting that there is "deep-rooted expectation of privacy").
89 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195; see also Williams, supra note 12, at 216
(quoting Brandeis). See generally Union Pacific R. Co., 141 U.S. at 251 (describing importance of
privacy right).
90 See James W. Hilliard, A Familiar Tort That May Not Exist in Illinois: The Unreasonable
Intrusion on Another's Seclusion, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 601, 607 (1999) (stating that "courts
conceived the independent tort of invasion of privacy around 1890" but that its current
formulation did not develop until after 1960); see also Prosser, supra note 12, at 383 (examining
tort of invasion of privacy); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 (calling for right to
privacy).
91 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (recognizing limited right to
informational privacy); Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994)
(defining right of informational privacy); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW 250.00-250.35 (McKinney
1999) (prohibiting various invasions of privacy).
92 See VWhalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600 (stating that there is interest in avoiding disclosure of
certain personal matters); Hill, 865 P.2d at 654 (defining informational privacy); see also
Williams, supra note 12, at 216 (discussing informational privacy).
93 See Klindera, supra note 55, at 403 n.40 (discussing press and First Amendment);
Williams, supra note 12, at 215-216 (recognizing conflict between right of privacy and First
Amendment); see also Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virgina Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (discussing right to receive information); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (discussing role of press as antidote to abuses of power).
94 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193 (calling for right to privacy); see also
Gromley, supra note 87, at 1335 (discussing Warren and Brandeis article). See generally Berger
v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 507-509 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing use of technology in claim of
invasion of privacy); Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 36Z 364-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing
camera interviews despite objections).
95 See Williams, supra note 12, at 216-217; see also Berger, 129 F.3d at 505 (discussing use of
wires and concerted microphones); Ayeni, 848 F. Supp. at 364-65 (discussing camera
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B. Current Concerns
The media's role in society is clearly beneficial. 96 The primary
goal of most media members is to uncover truthful information and
deliver it to others. 9 7 Ultimately, the question arises of how deeply
the media can investigate individuals' private lives to achieve this
goal. Today's media members have a variety of intrusive tools
available to them, which include adopting false identities, using
hidden cameras, and accompanying or following ambulances to and
from accident scenes. 98 These are common media practices and have
given rise to much litigation. 99 Yet the overwhelming majority of
cases that have involved threats to individual privacy, were
resolved in favor of the media.1 0 0 Although the media is not
shielded from all tort liability, the standards which support tort
claims are vague and ambiguous.101
The media's invasion into individuals' private lives has caused
much debate. 102 While this controversy has not always involved the
interviews despite objections).
96 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) (stating that '[b]eyond question, the
role of the media is important; acting as the "eyes and ears' of the public'); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (discussing importance of freedoms of press and speech);
Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (emphasizing importance of informed public opinion against
misgovernment).
97 See Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr.2d 92, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting
Professional Journalists' Code of Ethics). See generally Edward N. Cavanaugh, Journalists as
Professionals: Rethinking tMe Professional Exception Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 16 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 227, 227 (1995) (discussing journalists' responsibility to public to tell truth).
98 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What
the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 175 (1998) (listing intrusive tools available to
media); see also Victor A. Kovner & Harriette K. Dorsen, Recent Developments in Intrusion,
Private Facts, False Light and Commercialization Claims, 3 COMM. LAW 775, 783 (1990) (stating
examples of common media intrusion claims); Susan Paterno, The Lying Game, 1997 AM.
JOURNALISM REV. 40 (1997) (discussing tools journalists use to pry, spy and lie).
99 See Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1432 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding jury could find
reporters intruded into lives of family to coerce interview from health care executive); see also
Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (involving reporters obtrusively pursuing
target).
100 See Lidsky, snupra note 98, at 173 (stating courts concurrently resolve issues in media's
favor); see also Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 64 (1986) (discussing
media's privileges).
101 Compare Deteresa v. ABC, 121 F.3d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1137
(1998) (holding that plaintiff's privacy rights were not violated by covert audio-taping and
videotaping of interview by news media even though plaintiff expressly refused to be
interviewed on camera), with Sanders v. ABC, 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999) (holding that
plaintiff's reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by covert audio-taping by reporter,
even though plaintiff's conversation occurred in presence of co-workers). See generally
Nicholson v. McClatchy, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 64 (discussing extent of media privilege in
newsgathering); Lidsky, supra note 98, at 190-93 (discussing confusion caused by courts
differing interpretation and application of privilege for newsgathering techniques).
102 See Lidsky supra note 98, at 173 (noting that newsgathering techniques have created
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law's deficiencies in offering protection of privacy, more and more
individuals are finding it necessary to seek this protection.103 With a
growing number of television programs airing that broadcast actual
footage of events, the competition for newsgathering techniques has
escalated. 104
The methods used to quickly gather desirable information have
given rise to an increasing number of lawsuits.10 The media ridealong, now banned by the Supreme Court when there is an intrusion
into a private home, has been one such technique.106 A traditional
tort remedy is needed for those individuals whose privacy is
violated by the media in other contexts. 107
The jurisdictions that have dealt with this issue and have sided
more lawsuits); Scheim, supra note 15, at 185 (recognizing scrutiny of media for intrusive
newsgathering); see also Howard Kurtz, Public to Press: Just Play it Fair; They're Peeved by
Intnsiveness and Deception. But Are New Laws the Answer?, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1997, at B4
(listing events involving right to privacy that has held media's attention).
103 See Bernard W. Bell, Secrets and Lies: News Media and Law Enforcement Use of Deception
as an Investigative Tool, 60 U. PITr. L. REV. 745, 793-95 (1999) (discussing under-protection of
privacy by courts); Lidsky, supra note 98, at 182 (noting that 1996 poll by Center for Media &
Public Affairs showed that 80% of respondents felt media invaded privacy); Ethan E. Litwin,
Tie Investigative Reporter's Freedom and Responsibility: Reconciling Freedom of the Press with
Privacy Rights, 86 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1097-98 (1998) (discussing "shocking paucity" of cases
upholding invasion of privacy claims against media defendants); David A. Logan, Masked
Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious News Gathering,83 IOWA L. REV. 161, 161, n.12
(1997) (arguing that immunity from tort liability for newsgathering should be rejected). But see
John H. Fuson, Protecting the Press From Privacy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 663-69 (1999) (claiming
that pendulum has swung too far toward protecting individual privacy rights at expense of
media's need to gather news).
104 See Randall P. Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension Between Exemption
and Independence in Newsgathering By the Press, 47 EMORY L.J. 895, 919-20 (1998) (noting that
television is "experiencing dramatic competition from other media"); Lidsky, supra note 98, at
175 (discussing intrusive tools available to media because of market pressures); see also
Patemo, supranote 98, at 40 (discussing tools journalists use to gather news).
105 See Fuson, supra note 103, at 663 (discussing recent California cases that expand
privacy right); Lidsky, supra note 98, at 173 (reasoning intrusive newsgathering techniques
have given rise to more lawsuits); see also Scheim, supra note 15, at 185 (recognizing scrutiny
media has recently endured for intrusive tabloid journalism); Stephen M. Stern, Witch Hunt or
Protected Speech: Striking a First Amendment Balance Between Newsgathering and General Laws, 37
WASHBURN L.J. 115, 116 (1997) (discussing new breed of competing interests which posed
great threat to press and important speech).
106 See Lidsky, supra note 98, at 175 (discussing how media trails police into individual
homes); Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1104 (1999) (describing ride-along as partnership between press and law
enforcement); see also Paterno, supra note 98, at 40 (discussing tools journalists use to gather
news).
107 See Logan, supra note 103, at 161, n.12 (arguing that media should not be immune from
tort liability for newsgathering); see also Bell, supra note 103, at 793-95 (discussing underprotection of privacy by courts); Litwin, snpra note 103, at 1097-98 (discussing cases upholding
invasion of privacy claims against media). See generally Lidsky, supra note 98, at 182
(discussing public opinion that media invades privacy). But see Fuson, supra note 103, at 66369 (claiming there is too much protection of individual privacy rights at expense of need for
newsgathering).
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with the media based their decisions on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, which in part provides that, "when the subject-matter of
the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there is no invasion of
privacy." 108 If courts want to avoid privacy concerns, the news at
issue may simply be deemed a matter of public interest. 109 Whether
information is newsworthy, however, is not always easy to
determine.1 1 0
One of the key elements in creating a "newsworthiness" standard
is to determine which of two competing theories, normative or
descriptive, should be applied.' Under the normative theory, the
information is only required to be of some contribution to society or
108 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (1976); see also Faloona v. Hustler
Magazine, 799 F.2d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Restatement, and holding that
republication of photographs already in public domain was not actionable as invasion of
privacy); Morgan v. Calender, 780 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (noting Restatement
provides that newsworthy items are in scope of public concern); Sipple v. Chronicle Pub. Co.,
201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668-70 (Cal. App. 1984) (citing Restatement); Montesano v. Donrey Media
Grp., 668 P.2d 1081, 1084, 1086, 1088-89 (Nev. 1983) (citing Restatement); Cape Publ'ns Inc. v.
Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. App. 1982) (citing Restatement in decision); Howard v. Des
Moines Register, 283 N.W.2d 289, 298-302 (Iowa 1979) (explaining Restatement and its
application). But see Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1418 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing
Restatement as persuasive authority, but allowing injunction to stand against news
organization for harassing family members of public figure); McCabe v. Village Voice Inc., 550
F. Supp. 525, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (acknowledging that Restatement was adopted in
Pennsylvania, but holding that nude photograph of plaintiff was neither newsworthy nor
matter of public concern). See generally Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494
(1975) (describing Restatement and its application to different theories for claims of invasion
of privacy).
109 See Lucy Noble Inman, Hall v. Post: North Carolina Rejects Claim of Invasion of Privacy by
Truthful Publication of Embarrassing Facts, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1474, 1477 (1989) (discussing
Restatement requirement that plaintiff prove matter is of public concern); see also Robin L.
Blume, Court of Appeals Leaves False Light Invasion of Privacy Issue Unresolved in Libel and
Invasion of Privacy Case, 47 S.C. L. REV. 151, 152 (1995) (noting dispositive issue in such cases
involves defining matter as public concern, and matters of public concern demand heightened
judicial scrutiny); Williams, supra note 12, at 216 (stating that courts "dance" around First
Amendment issues).
110 See The Right of Privacy: Nornative-DescriptiveConfitsion in the Defense of Newsworthiness,
30 U. CH. L. REV. 722, 725-26 (1963) [hereinafter Comment] (discussing differing
interpretations of newsworthiness); see also Gary L. Bostwick, Die Newsworthiness Element:
Shuhinan v. Group W Prods., Inc. Muddies the Waters, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 225, 225-26 (1999)
(noting what constitutes "newsworthy" is unclear); Dendy, supra note 58, at 148-49 (stating
courts provide broad newsworthiness defense); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 1007 (1989) (noting
common law is confused about applying newsworthiness standard).
111 See Shulman v. Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469, 481 (Cal. 1998) (acknowledging
different interpretations of newsworthiness); see also Comment, supra note 110, at 725-26
(describing different interpretations); Gary Williams, "On the QT and Very Hush Hush": A
Proposal to Extend California's Constitutional Right to Privacy to Protect Public Figures From
Publication of Confidential Personal Inforuation, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 337, 344-46 (1999)
(discussing standards to determine newsworthiness); Linda N. Woito & Patrick McNulty, The
Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First Amendmnent: Should the Community Decide Newsworthiness?,
64 IOWA L. REV. 185, 196-97, 200-202 (1978) (discussing newsworthiness standards).

182

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 15:165

of general public interest to be considered newsworthy.112 This
standard would give the media considerable leeway in determining
newsworthiness. 113 If the descriptive standard is applied, then the
material would have to be of widespread public interest, which
would result in sales and television ratings determining whether the
information is newsworthy." 4 In seeking a middle ground between
the descriptive and normative theories, courts within each
jurisdiction have varied considerably.115
The Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of the press
extends beyond simple accounts of public proceedings.11 6 The Court
acknowledged that exposure "to others in varying degrees is a
concomitant of life [...] The risk of this exposure is an essential
incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom
112 See Shuinan, 955 P.2d at 481 (acknowledging different interpretations of
newsworthiness); Anthony J. DeGirolano, The Tort Invasion of Privacy in Ohio: Videotape
Invasion and the Negligence Standard, 52 OHiO ST. L.J. 1599, 1607 (1991) (discussing normative
approach); see also Comment, supra note 110, at 725-26 (describing different interpretations);
Joseph Elford, Trafficking in Stolen Information: A "Hierarchy of Rights" Approach to the Private
Facts Tort, 105 YALE L.J. 727, 728 (1995) (discussing newsworthiness criterion which gauges
contribution of speech to public debate); Williams, supra note 111, at 344-46 (discussing
standards to determine newsworthiness); Woito and McNulty, supra note 111, at 196-97, 200202 (discussing newsworthiness standards).
113 See Shuhnan, 955 P.2d at 481 (discussing different standards); see also Comment, supra
note 110, at 725-26; DeGirolano, supra note 112, at 1607 (discussing normative approach);
Elford, supra note 112, at 728 (discussing newsworthiness criterion which gauges contribution
of speech to public debate).
114 See Woito and McNulty, supra note 111, at 196-97 (discussing difficulty in deciding if
"newsworthy" means more than widespread public interest); see also DeGirolano, supra note
112, at 1607 (discussing descriptive standard); Peter Gielniak, Tipping the Scales: Courts Struggle
to Strike a Balance Between the Public Disclosure of Private Facts Tort and the First Amendment, 39
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1217, 1222 (1999) (discussing balance between right of privacy and
public right to know). See generally Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment
Jurisprudence,17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 289-92 (1999) (noting ratings blur distinctions
between news and entertainment).
115 See Gonzalez, supra note 64, at 948 (stating newsworthiness standard is hard for judges
to impose). Coinpare Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1953) (holding no action for
invasion of privacy would lie solely for publishing photograph of plaintiffs embracing) with
Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 277 (1953) (holding public interest did not require
publishing photograph of plaintiffs embracing). Compare Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806,
809 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that publication of stories in New Yorker magazine describing
present life of former child prodigy who had fallen into obscurity was matter of public
concern and widespread interest, and therefore, not invasion of privacy) with Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 287 (1931) (holding use of plaintiffs true name in motion picture about her
former life as prostitute was unnecessary and therefore actionable as invasion of privacy).
116 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); see also Watters v. TSR, Inc., 715 F. Supp.
819, 821 (W.D. Ky. 1989) (citing Time decision as precedent in holding that publishing and
distributing of game board "Dungeons & Dragons" was protected under First Amendment);
Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 253 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ill. 1969) (relying on Court's decision in Time
to uphold lower court's decision that truthful publication of questionable medical practices of
physician was not libelous); All Diet Food Dist., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 290 N.Y.S.2d 445, 447 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1967) (citing Time decision in holding that picture of plaintiff's store in which trade
name was identifiable and caption read "FOOD FADS AND FRAUDS" was not libelous).
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of speech and of press." 1 17 Yet the Supreme Court has rarely dealt
directly with the issue of whether the press has a constitutional
privilege to publish private facts.11 8
In Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn,119 an action was brought against
a television reporter who published the name of a rape victim that
had been acquired from a court proceeding.120 The Supreme Court
held that because the reporter had published facts that were already
available to the public, he could not be held liable, and to do so
would hinder the dissemination of other necessary information. 121
This holding has been reiterated by the Court in later decisions.1 22
Most jurisdictions agree, however, that the Cox decision does not
establish a test for newsworthiness or provide useful guidelines for
establishing such a test.123
With no clear standard to assist in determining the extent of the
media's liability with regard to invasion of privacy, and no
sufficient guidance from the Supreme Court, many jurisdictions
have been looking for alternate ways to hold the media liable for

117 Tine, 385 U.S. at 388; see also Gielniak, supra note 114, at 1222 (discussing balance
between Fourth and First amendments); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196 (arguing for
privacy right).
118 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536 (1989) (holding publication constitutional
when obtained from government record); Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of
Privacy, 71 WASH. L. REV. 683, 698 (1996) (noting Florida Star decision has been narrowly
construed). But see Lidsky, supra note 98, at 176 (stating that "newsgathering, unlike news
dissemination, receives only limited constitutional protection").
119 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
120 See Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 473 (1975).
121 See Ibid. at 492 (indicating importance of allowing media to publish information, so
public may vote intelligently, form opinions concerning administration of government and
scrutinize administration of justice).
122 See FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 536 (holding publication constitutional when obtained from
government record). But see Coplin v. Fairfield Pub. Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395,
1404 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that "only in the 'extreme case' is it constitutionally permissible
for a governmental entity to regulate the public disclosure of facts about private individuals"
and citing Gilbert v. Medical Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981)); Haynes v. Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) (broadening interpretation of Cox Broadcasting,
stating, "The Court must believe that the First Amendment greatly circumscribes the right
even of a private figure to obtain damages for the publication of newsworthy facts about him,
even when they are facts of a kind that people want very much to conceal"). See generally
Scott, supra note 118, at 698 (noting Florida Stardecision has been narrowly construed).
123 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later: hn the Defense of
Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 745, 756 (1991) (noting problems exist in defining
newsworthiness); see also Bob Rowland, Diana's Law: Would It Survive ConstitutionalScrutiny?,
27 CAP. U. L. REV. 191, 208-10 (1998) (discussing various standards of newsworthiness); Justin
W. Wertman, The Newsworthiness Requirement of the Privilege of Neutral Reportage Is a Matter of
Public Concern, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 790 (1996) (arguing newsworthiness requirement is
too broad); Woito & McNulty, supra note 111, at 196-97, 200-202 (discussing newsworthiness
standards).
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privacy invasion.124

IV. AN APPROACH TO HOLDING THE MEDIA LIABLE
In Wilson v. Lane,125 the Supreme Court found that police officers

should be held liable for Fourth Amendment violations that occur
during a ride-along, but did not impose liability on media
members.126 The media, however, could have been held liable for
intrusion into seclusion,127 as it was in the California case, Shulman
v. Group WProductions.128

The facts of Shulman centered on a "reality show" that videotaped
and broadcast the medical treatment of an accident victim.129

Specifically, the plaintiffs were involved in a serious car accident
and were pinned in their car. A cameraman filmed the plaintiff's
extrication from the car and transport to the hospital in a helicopter.
The footage was then broadcast on the September 29, 1990 episode
of On Scene: Emergency Response.130 The plaintiffs, who never

consented to the filming or the broadcast, filed a complaint which
included two causes of action for invasion of privacy, one based
upon public disclosure of private facts and the other upon
intrusion. 131 The California Supreme Court concluded that First
Amendment protection of the media outweighed the right to
informational privacy, reasoning that the "broadcast was of
legitimate public concern" and the public disclosure of private facts
"[bore] a logical relationship to the newsworthy subject of the
broadcast and [was] not intrusive in great disproportion to their
124 See Shulman v. Group W Productions, 955 P.2d 469, 469 (Cal. 1998); see also Bostwick,
supra note 110, at 225-26 (stating that Shulnan decision failed to clarify what constitutes
newsworthy); Gielniak, supra note 114, at 1243 (discussing new precedent developed in
Shulinan); Klindera, supra note 55, at 423-24 (discussing implications of Shulman); Williams,
supranote 12, at 217 (discussing court's holding in Shulnan).
125 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
126 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614; see also Home v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 249-50 (1999)
(explaining holding in Wilson); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 510 (following holding in
Wilson).
127 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); see also Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 678 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (demonstrating courts willingness to adopt
restatement).
128 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
129 See Shuhnan, 955 P.2d at 475-477 (stating facts); see also Calvert, supra note 114, at 275
(discussing facts of Shuinan); Fuson, supra note 103, at 638-39 (explaining specific facts of
Shuhnan).
130 See Shulinan, 955 P.2d at 475-477; see also Calvert, supra note 114, at 275; Fuson, supra
note 103, at 638-39.
131 See Shuhnan, 955 P.2d at 475-477.
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relevance." 132 Although the media prevailed on the public
disclosure claim, the court sustained the cause of action for the claim
based on intrusion, stating that the analysis for intrusion is far less
"deferential" to the First Amendment. 133 The court reasoned that an
intrusion into a private place, conversation, or other matter would
not be justified by the hope of getting a news story.134 One year
later, California reaffirmed this holding in Sanders v. American
Broadcasting Co.,135 when an investigative reporter intruded upon an
individual's privacy through the use of a hidden camera and
microphone.
Privacy is highly valued in our society.136 A great deal of
importance is also placed on the functions of the media. 137 The
Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to define a clear
standard for "newsworthiness."'1 38 In our media-driven society, with
technology advancing rapidly, the Court must protect the privacy of
individuals by regulating newsgathering techniques.139 The First
Amendment should always be carefully considered, but the Court
must establish a decisive standard for holding the media liable for
invasion of privacy. The media needs guidance to determine when
its activities will be protected, and when it is merely promoting
132 See Shuinan, 955 P.2d at 478; see also Fuson, supra note 103, at 653-58 (discussing
holding of Shulinan); Williams, supra note 12, at 217 (discussing court's holding in Shuhnan).
133 See Shuhinan, 955 P.2d at 497-98.
134 See Shulnan, 955 P.2d at 497-98; see also Bostwick, supranote 110, at 225-26 (stating that
Shulnan decision failed to clarify what constitutes newsworthy); Gieniak, supra note 114, at
1243 (discussing new precedent developed in Shuhnan); Klindera, supra note 55, at 423-24
(discussing implications of Shuhnan); Williams, supra note 12, at 217-18 (discussing court's
holding in Shuhnan).
135 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
136 See Fuson, supra note 103, at 635 (discussing privacy); see also Galella v. Onassis, 487
F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding photographers breached right to privacy); Randell Boese,
Redefining Privacy? Anti-Paparazzi Legislation and Freedom of the Press, 17 COMM. LAW. 1, 3
(1999) (discussing claims against reporters).
137 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) (describing media as "'eyes and ears"
of the public'); Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (discussing importance of
freedoms of press and speech); Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250 (emphasizing importance of informed
public opinion against misgovernment). But see Michael Emery & Edwin Emery, The Press of
America: An Interpretive History of the Mass-Media, 284-89 (8th ed. 1996) (analyzing sensational
journalism); Fuson, supra note 103, at 645-45 (discussing sensationalism); Adam Goodheart,
Sleaze Journalism? Its an Old Stony, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1998 at A7 (discussing history of
sensationalism).
138 See Comment, supra note 110, at 725-26 (discussing differing interpretations of
newsworthiness); see also Bostwick, supra note 110, at 225-26 (noting what constitutes
"newsworthy" is unclear); Dendy, supra note 58, at 148-49 (stating courts provide broad
newsworthiness defense); Post, supra note 110, at 1007 (noting common law is confused about
applying newsworthiness standard).
139 See Fuson, supra note 103, at 663 (stating California's approach focuses on
newsgathering techniques).
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voyeurism.1 40 By adopting the standard set in Shulman, and
allowing the media to be held liable based on a tort claim of
intrusion, the Court will achieve these goals. 1 41
Conclusion
It is essential that the media have freedom of the press in order to
provide useful and newsworthy information to the public. The First
Amendment is designed to protect these interests without hindering
the media in its newsgathering techniques.
The right to privacy should ensure that a person in the sanctity of
his or her home is free from invasion either by the government or
the media. Individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
this regard and a legitimate interest in protecting this right. If the
media is allowed to have free range into private homes without the
consent of the homeowner, constitutional protections are
considerably weakened. The long-awaited decision in Wilson now
prevents newsgathering techniques that invade an individual's
home in this way.
Still, the Supreme Court must decide the issue of media liability in
other contexts. The media's ability to make information available to
the public is an important and legitimate function.
The
constitutional right to privacy, however, must be measured against
the freedom of the press so that information will be made accessible
to the public, while privacy rights are maintained. Valid tort claims
are available and some circuit courts have relied on them to hold the
media liable. The Supreme Court should establish a clear standard
that will fairly balance the competing interests and allow greater
liability of the media for invasion of privacy.
Allison L. Lampert & William Kirrane

140 See Calvert, supra note 114, at 296 (comparing voyeurism with mass-media).

141 See Shulman v. Group W, 955 P.2d 469,497-98 (Cal. 1998).

